Colorado DUI Laws - DUI Attorney Motion to Suppress a DUI Stop
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Here's a sample Motion to Suppress a Colorado DUI Stop that Colorado DUI Attorney Chris Cessna Uses to defend Colorado Drunk Driving Cases:
MOTION TO SUPPRESS COLORADO DUI STOP
COMES NOW, the Defendant, T.A.S., by and through the Law Office of Christopher Hunter Cessna, LLC., and through his attorney, Christopher Hunter Cessna, and moves this Honorable Court to suppress the detention of the Defendant and any and all statements, observations and evidence which was obtained through the illegal detention and arrest under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. As grounds, the Defendant states:
1. On July 17, 2003, T.A.S. was detained without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, but under the pretext of a welfare check by Cherry Hills Police Sergeant, Paul Shattuck. Sergeant Shattuck subsequently arrested and charged T.A.S. with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
2. A valid investigatory stop must meet three critical requirements. First, the law enforcement officer may stop a person when that officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Stone v. People, 485 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1971); C.R.S. 16-3-103 (1). Second, the purpose of the intrusion must be reasonable. Id. Third, the scope and character of the intrusion must be reasonably related to the purpose of the stop. Id. See also People v. Wells, 676 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1984).
3. For the prosecution to meet its burden under this three prong test, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the moment of the initial contact. Terry supra; Stone supra. The facts articulated by the officer are judged by the objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the encounter cause a reasonable man to believe the stop and seizure was necessary. People v. Mascarenas, 726 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1986).
4. Warrantless arrests must be accompanied by probable cause or exigent circumstances. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Schreyer, 640 P.2d 1147 (Colo. 1982). Probable cause is defined as facts available to a reasonably cautious officer which would warrant a belief that an offense has been or was being committed. People v. Navran, 483 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1971).
5. According to numerous statements made by Sergeant Shattuck, T.A.S. was contacted after the Sergeant initially noticed that the defendant had simply parked his vehicle off the roadway and turned his parking lights on in a residential neighborhood. According to the Sergeant's own statements, when he turned his patrol vehicle around to contact the defendant, the defendant had moved his car to the other side of the road and once again parked his car legally. The Sergeant states that the defendant was not parked illegally, nor did he at anytime have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to approach or detain T.A.S.. Nonetheless, the Sergeant pulled in behind the defendant's parked car, activated his overhead (red and blue) police lights, aimed his "take-down" lights at T.A.S.'s car, and made contact with T.A.S. while in full police uniform , including service weapon and other police equipment.
6. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court held that a person is seized, and Fourth Amendment protections apply "when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). For consensual encounters, the test is whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that he or she was free to leave and to disregard an officer's request for information. People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 843 (Colo. 1994).
7. The Colorado Supreme Court further distinguished between investigatory stops and consensual encounters, as stops are based on suspicion of illegal conduct and a consensual interview involves no restraint of an individual's liberty, but rather consists of an encounter which is voluntary in nature, and one in which a reasonable person would feel free to terminate contact with police at anytime. People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85 (Colo. 1995). The Court further held that "when . . . the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for continued detention and interrogation of citizens." Id.
8. The Redinger Court's rationale is applicable and analogous here. Even assuming arguendo that the Sergeant was justified in contacting T.A.S. under the pretext of a "welfare check," his justification for conducting a consensual encounter and subsequent detention of T.A.S.S evaporated the moment he turned his vehicle around to contact the defendant and noticed that T.A.S. was not in need of assistance since he had moved his car to the other side of the street without any trouble.
9. Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Paynter admitted the State's evidence after police detained the occupant of a car (which was also parked legally) during what the officer described as a "consensual encounter" with the defendant. In admitting the State's evidence, the Court warned that the evidence was only being admitted because, ". . . there was no display of authority or control by activating siren or any patrol car overhead lights." People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 73 (Colo. 1998). In the case before this Court, Sergeant Shattuck displayed such signs of authority and control by pulling in behind the defendant's parked car, activating his overhead (red and blue) police lights, and aiming his "take-down" lights at T.A.S.'s car
10. Therefore, all evidence observations and statements obtained as a result of an unconstitutional detention and seizure must be suppressed as tainted by the illegal action of law enforcement officers. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1989).
11. T.A.S. respectfully requests that this Court set this matter for a hearing.
WHEREFORE, T.A.S. requests this Court to suppress any and all evidence obtained from his illegal detention at the hands of government agents.
Dated this 25th day of November, 2003. Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________
Christopher Hunter Cessna, #31702
Attorney for Defendant
5400 Ward Road
Bldg. V, Suite 200
Arvada, Colorado 80002
Telephone: 800-DIAL-DUI
ORDER: MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the Attorney's MOTION TO SUPPRESS, the Court hereby:
[ ] Grant's Attorney's motion.
[ ] Denies Attorney's motion.
[ ] Sets the Attorney's motion for a hearing on the _______ th day of ______________ , 2003, at ______________ .
DONE this _______ day of ____________________, 2003.
BY THE COURT:
_________________________________
County Court Judge
CALL 1-800-DIAL-DUI (Areas 303 and 720) NOW TO TALK TO COLORADO DUI ATTORNEY CHRIS CESSNA
OR:
Christopher H. Cessna
5400 Ward Road
Bldg. V, Suite 200
Arvada, Colorado 80002
1-800-DIAL-DUI (area codes 303 and 720)
COLORADO DUI DENVER COURTHOUSE INFORMATION
Jefferson http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/01st/dist01.htm
Adams http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/17th/17dist.htm
Broomfield: http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/17th/17dist.htm
Denver http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/02nd/02dist.htm
Arapahoe http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/18th/18dist.htm
Douglas http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/18th/18dist.htm
Gilpin http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/01st/dist01.htm
Boulder http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/20th/20dist.htm
Weld http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/19th/19dist.htm
Elbert http://www.courts.state.co.us/district/18th/18dist.htm
Counties: Jefferson, Adams, Denver, Arapahoe, Broomfield, Douglas, Gilpin, Boulder, Weld, Elbert
Cities: Denver, Golden, Brighton, Littleton, Aurora, Centennial, Broomfield, Castle Rock, Boulder, Greeley, Black Hawk
The most common acronyms for drunk driving in Colorado are:
DUI or Driving Under the Influence, 42-4-1301
DUI per Se or Driving with Excessive Alcohol Content, 42-4-1301
DWAI or Driving While Ability Impaired 42-4-1301
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